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Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to 
maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is 
perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a 
skill type that pays positive taxes to one country and whose utility is larger than the average 
utility in the other country or in which the lowest skilled are subsidized. We also show that it 
is possible for the most highly skilled to receive a net transfer funded by taxes on lower 
skilled individuals in equilibrium. These findings confirm the race-to-the-bottom thesis in this 
setting. 
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When nonlinear income taxes are set optimally for a closed economy, the high skilled pay
taxes in order to subsidize the low skilled. However, in the presence of interjurisdictional
labor mobility, high taxes might act as a catalyst for the high skilled to exit from a
region, thereby thwarting the redistributive goals of its government. In this article, we
investigate income tax competition between two national governments who set nonlinear
income tax schedules when individuals of all skills are perfectly mobile between the two
countries. We consider a discrete-type version of the model used in the seminal paper of
Mirrlees (1971) to analyze optimal nonlinear income taxation for a closed economy. In
order to isolate the impact of adding interjurisdictional tax competition to the Mirrlees
model without at the same time introducing other factors that might aﬀect an individual’s
choice of country of residence, we employ the same assumptions as are typically adopted
in the discrete version of the Mirrlees model and assume that there are no impediments
to moving between countries.
Speciﬁcally, we suppose that each government designs a tax schedule to maximize
an average utilitarian social welfare function deﬁned over the utilities of its residents,
given the tax schedule in the other country, but taking full account of any mobility that
might result from its choice. With ﬁxed, immobile populations, this welfare criterion
provides a motivation for transferring income from higher to lower skilled individuals.
We also suppose that there is perfect labor mobility. That is, no resources need to be
expended in order to move and there are no frictions to mobility based on residential
attachments. We assume that it is only possible for a government to tax the income
at source of its residents. It is not possible to tax the earnings of citizens who reside
in the other country, nor do such individuals make remittances to their relatives in the
country of origin. We further assume that the labor productivity of an individual does
not depend on the country of residence. When combined with our assumption that labor
is perfectly mobile, this assumption implies that locational decisions only depend on the
tax schedules oﬀered by the two countries.
Free labor mobility leads to aggressive competition. We show that there are no
equilibria in our tax-setting game in which there is a skill type that pays positive taxes
to one country and whose utility is larger than the average utility in the other country.
As a corollary to this result, it follows that there are no equilibria in which individuals
with the highest skill make positive tax payments to either country. We also show that
it is impossible for the lowest-skilled residents in either country to receive a subsidy in
equilibrium. An example is also provided that demonstrates that competition for the
most highly skilled is so intense that it is even possible for them to receive a net transfer
funded by taxes on lower skilled individuals in equilibrium.
Individuals make choices on two margins. The labor-leisure decision operates on
the intensive margin, whereas the locational decision operates at the extensive margin.1
1We are ruling out the possibility that individuals may work in more than one jurisdiction. This pos-
sibility is modeled by Osmundsen (1999). The related problems of taxing multinational ﬁrms is discussed
1The labor-leisure decision is largely driven by marginal tax rates, whereas the locational
decision is more sensitive to average rates of taxation. Because the adjustments at the
extensive margin, not the adjustments at the intensive margin, are the driving force
behind our results, we are conﬁned to making statements about total tax liabilities.
There is widespread concern that tax competition among jurisdictions for mobile cap-
ital and labor places severe constraints on the ability of these jurisdictions to engage in
substantial redistributive taxation, to provide welfare programs for the needy, to main-
tain high safety and environmental standards, and to regulate labor practices, among
other desirable social objectives. In other words, tax competition results in a “race to
the bottom.” The importance of this phenomenon in the context of interjurisdictional
competition among communities in the same country was recognized by Stigler (1957),
but it is also a familiar feature of competition between national governments. With an
ever expanding European Union, barriers to mobility across national boundaries within
Europe are eroding.2 Similarly, restrictions on the free ﬂow of capital around the world
are diminishing. These developments have been accompanied by increased worries that
the welfare state will wither and die due to the inability of national governments to main-
tain their social policies as the impediments to capital and labor mobility are relaxed. It
is therefore important to determine the extent to which these concerns are justiﬁed.
There is a substantial literature that investigates the constraints that the competition
between governments for mobile capital and labor places on the ability of governments
to raise tax revenue and redistribute income. What distinguishes our analysis from the
existing literature is that we assume that all governments act strategically, that gov-
ernments operate in a second-best environment in which they are restricted to using
nonlinear income taxes, and that there is perfect labor mobility of all skill types. The
existing literature has made one or more of the following assumptions: only one coun-
try acts strategically, ﬁrst-best tax policies are possible, only linear income taxation is
possible, or there is less than perfect labor mobility.
For the most part, the research on interjurisdictional tax competition assumes that
there is full information about the relevant characteristics of the agents in the economy.
For an overview of the main issues considered and a review of what has been learned
in this literature, see Cremer and Pestieau (2004) and Wildasin (2006a). However, in
the context of redistributive income taxation, it is not only the tax policies of foreign
governments that constrain the design of a country’s income tax schedule by creating
incentives for the wealthy to emigrate or the foreign poor to immigrate. As emphasized
by Mirrlees (1971), the inability of a government to distinguish individuals with diﬀerent
skills also limits the amount of redistribution that is possible. Surprisingly, very little
attention has been directed to investigating the validity of the race-to-the-bottom thesis
in the presence of such information asymmetries when labor is internationally mobile.
by Gresik (2001) and Olsen and Osmundsen (2001). Calzolari (2004) studies regulating multinationals.
2The importance of international migration for OECD countries is apparent from the data presented
in Wildasin (2006b). For example, he documents that gross migration ﬂows for most European Union
countries exceeded 0.5 percent of total population in 2000, and in some cases exceeded 1 percent.
2Our ﬁndings demonstrate that concerns about a race to the bottom are well founded
when there is perfect labor mobility.
Our results stand in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings of Hamilton, Lozachmeur, and
Pestieau (2002). They show that there is no race to the bottom when the two countries
choose linear income tax schedules to maximize a Rawlsian objective function when only
the low skilled are mobile and these individuals do not work. However, the Rawlsian ob-
jective adopted is nonstandard. Governments are assumed to maximize the poll subsidy
available to the low skilled, not to maximize the utility of the worst-oﬀ residents. With
the latter objective, no equilibrium with a positive poll subsidy exists because either
government would want to lower its poll subsidy in order to induce the low skilled to
move.
There are relatively few articles that consider strategic interaction among governments
who can employ fully nonlinear income taxes when some individuals are free to choose
both their country of residence and how much to work.3
Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) consider a political economy model of competition
between a large number of small countries when there are two skill types and only one of
them is mobile. The objective function of a government is determined by majority rule,
with the consequence that it wants to maximize the utility of the type of individual who
is in the majority. Hamilton and Pestieau focus on identifying what distributions of skill
types communities can achieve in equilibrium.
Like us, Piaser (2007) studies nonlinear income tax competition by two benevolent
governments in the presence of labor mobility, but in a model with only two skills.
However, there are important diﬀerences between our work and his that lead to more
intense competition for the highly skilled in the problem that we consider. Piaser assumes
that both countries are identical, both in the objective that they pursue and in their
initial skill distribution. He restricts attention to symmetric equilibria and, hence, while
the potential for free movement of labor constrains what tax schedules are sustainable,
nobody actually moves. In contrast to our assumption that labor is perfectly mobile,
Piaser assumes that only one type of individual is mobile, but even for the mobile type,
it is costly to move. Naturally, the introduction of moving costs softens tax competition,
but it also provides a greater role for adjustments at the intensive margin to shape tax
policy, which permits Piaser to make statements about equilibrium marginal tax rates,
which we do not. Piaser considers two kinds of social welfare functions, one Rawlsian and
one that evaluates outcomes by taking a weighted sum of the utilities of representatives
of each type of individual, with the relative weight chosen so as to favor redistribution
towards the low skilled. Both objectives have the feature that they are entirely indiﬀerent
to the number of individuals of a given type who reside in a country; all that matters
is the utility achieved by each type. In contrast, with the average utilitarian criterion
employed here, every resident counts positively. As a consequence, there is an incentive
to compete for skilled individuals because, due to the incentive constraints that operate
3Huber (1999) considers how competition for mobile capital aﬀects the choice of an optimal nonlinear
income tax schedule when labor is immobile.
3within a country, they have the highest utilities, and this would be the case even when
increasing the number of skilled individuals residing in a country does not increase that
country’s tax revenue.
Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2010) also consider nonlinear income tax competition
between two governments when there are two types of individuals. They assume that
only the high-skilled are mobile and that these individuals diﬀer in their costs of mov-
ing. Lipatov and Wehenrieder consider three social objective functions: maximizing tax
revenue (subject to a minimum individual utility constraint), Rawlsian maximin uility,
and total utilitarianism with no weight given to immigrants. Their main ﬁndings are
that the tax competition lowers the taxes imposed on the high skilled (compared to the
no-mobility benchmark) which, in turn, relaxes their downward self-selection constraint,
thereby reducing the need to distort the low-skilled, whose labor supply is therefore
increased.
The only other article that considers nonlinear income tax competition with mobility
of all skill types is Morelli, Yang, and Ye (2010). Individuals in their model diﬀer not
only in their skills, but also in their costs of moving. Morelli, Yang, and Ye are primarily
interested in whether having uniﬁed taxation for two jurisdictions or having tax com-
petition between them would be chosen by majority rule in a constitutional stage that
determines this institutional design question. They assume that each government wants
to maximize the total utility of those individuals that fall within its tax jurisdiction.
Analytical results are obtained when there are three skill levels. In this case, the lowest
skilled prefer the unitary government so as to receive a higher subsidy, whereas the high-
est skilled prefer tax competition so as to lower their tax payments. The middle class
faces countervailing incentives. They want to receive transfers from the highest skilled,
but do not want to subsidize the lowest skilled. As a consequence, which regime is chosen
depends on the preferences of the middle class.
Considerably more attention has been devoted to the analysis of optimal income
taxation with mobile labor in the absence of strategic competition between governments.
Early contributions to this literature include Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) and Wilson
(1980) for the case of linear taxation and Mirrlees (1982) for the case of nonlinear taxation.
Wilson (2006) provides an insightful interpretive survey of this literature. In much of
this literature, potential emigrants choose between the best labor-consumption bundle
available at home and some predetermined bundle or utility abroad. There is a potential
conﬂict between a government’s desire to tax on the basis of ability to pay and the
possibility that more able individuals might emigrate to avoid high tax burdens. As
shown by Wilson (1980) for linear taxation and by Wilson (1992) for nonlinear taxation,
individual decisions made at the intensive and extensive margins can interact in complex
ways, with the possibility of migration by skilled individuals lowering their average taxes
while at the same time raising their marginal tax rates compared to what would be
the case in a closed economy.4 With strategic interaction, as in our model, decisions
4See also the recent articles by Krause (2009) and Simula and Trannoy (2010), both of which deal
with nonlinear taxation.
4made at the extensive margin play an even more central role, further constraining the
amount of redistribution that is possible compared to what would be the case when other
jurisdictions act passively.
We present our model in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we respectively consider
taxation of the high skilled and subsidization of the low skilled. Examples of equilibria
are provided in Section 5. In Section 6, we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
There are two countries, A and B, who have access to the same constant-returns-to-scale
production technology that can be used to transform a single input, eﬀective labor, into
a single output. Units of these goods are normalized so that one unit of eﬀective labor
produces one unit of output. There are n ≥ 2 types of individuals who diﬀer in their
labor productivities. An individual’s labor productivity is the same in both countries.
A type i individual has productivity wi; that is, a unit of labor time supplied by such
an individual is equivalent to wi units of eﬀective labor. Thus, by supplying li units of
labor, an individual of type i produces yi = wili units of output. The production sector
is perfectly competitive and, hence, the wage rate of an individual of type i equals his
productivity wi and his pretax income equals the amount of output yi that he produces.
Types are ordered so that w1 <w 2 < ···<w n. The total number of individuals of type
i is Ni > 0. The distribution of these types is common knowledge.
Every individual has the same preferences over consumption c and hours of work l.
These preferences are represented by the cardinally signiﬁcant utility function u(c,l).
The function u(·) is strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in l, strictly concave, and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable. For an individual with labor productivity w, his utility








These preferences satisfy the usual single-crossing property. In (y,c)-space, each person’s
indiﬀerence curves are upward sloping, with the slope increasing along an indiﬀerence
curve as y increases. Furthermore, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve through (y,c)
decreases with an increase in w.
Utility is not directly aﬀected by location; that is, holding consumption and labor
supply ﬁxed, individuals are indiﬀerent between country of residence. Thus, countries
possess no country-speciﬁc amenities that any individual might ﬁnd attractive and that
would therefore introduce frictions to labor mobility based on residential attachments.
We also assume that no expenditure of resources is required to change country of resi-
dence. Together, these features of our model imply that labor is perfectly mobile. As
a consequence, it does not matter whether we regard individuals as having an initial
country of residence or if we treat them as being initially stateless. For concreteness,
we make the latter assumption, so an individual acquires his nationality by his choice of
residence.
5The government in each country has the authority to levy taxes on its residents for
the purpose of redistributing income among them. Neither government can observe the
labor productivity or the hours worked of any individual, but each of them can observe
who resides within its borders and what each resident’s pretax income is. Accordingly,
taxes are based on labor income. The governments simultaneously and independently
announce type-independent income tax schedules, τA(·) and τB(·), where τj(y)i st h e
tax paid by a resident of country j, j = A,B, whose income is y. Each individual then
chooses where to reside and how much labor to supply taking these tax schedules as
given. These choices determine the amount of tax he pays, the government to which he
remits these payments, and his after-tax income. Because there are no resource costs
associated with the choice of residence, his consumption of the single output good equals
his after-tax income. The number of individuals of type i choosing to reside in country
j is N
j
i , where NA
i + NB
i = Ni for all i.
For expositional purposes, we mostly think of countries as oﬀering income-consumption
bundles to diﬀerent skill types. Strictly speaking, countries oﬀer a tax function. The bun-
dle that is oﬀered to type i by country j is type i’s most preferred bundle on the tax






n)a st h eallocation oﬀered
by country j.
Because labor is freely mobile and the tax schedules are anonymous, with the amount





i of a type i individual residing in country j must satisfy a set of self-selection
constraints.5 See, for example, Guesnerie and Seade (1982). These self-selection con-
straints only apply to income-consumption bundles that are actually chosen by some



















h;wi) with h  = i, then an individual of type i





is standard in ﬁnite population optimal nonlinear income tax models when there is no
mobility.
An immediate implication of the self-selection constraints is that if individuals of the
same type reside in both countries, then they must receive the same utility regardless
of where they live. Furthermore, within a country, (i) consumption and income are
nondecreasing in type and two types have the same income if and only if they have the
same consumption, in which case they are said to be bunched, and (ii) utility is increasing
in type.











i) for all i. In a closed
5Our restrictions on the tax schedules conform to the practice in the optimal tax literature, rather
than in the mechanism design literature, which typically places no a priori restrictions on the admissible
mechanisms. Note that we are not appealing to the revelation principle here, which, as discussed in
Martimort and Stole (2002), is problematic in multi-principal settings.
6economy, the taxation principle says that any allocation that satisﬁes the corresponding
self-selection constraints can be supported by a tax schedule. See, for example, Gues-
nerie and Seade (1982). In our two-country model, the taxation principle needs slight
qualiﬁcation because not all pairs of allocations that satisfy (2.2) can be supported by a
pair of tax schedules. If N
j
i = 0 and individuals of type i prefer a diﬀerent bundle oﬀered
by country j to the one oﬀered them in aj, then it is possible to satisfy (2.2) without
having aj supportable by a tax schedule. However, for any such allocation aj, there exists
another allocation for country j that only diﬀers in bundles for which N
j
i = 0 that is
supportable by a tax schedule and for which any such type still chooses to reside in the
other country. For example, for such i, they can be oﬀered what this type is oﬀered in
the other country provided that they choose to live in the other country even though
they are indiﬀerent about where they reside. Thus, restricting attention to allocations
that satisfy (2.2) does not rule out any tax schedules of interest.







i,j = A,B, i =1 ,2,...,n, (2.3)
in taxes to government j.I f T
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Each government wants to maximize the average utility of its residents.6 Formally,

































,j = A,B, (2.4)
where u
j
i is the utility of a type i individual residing in country j.7 With this welfare
criterion, the individuals whom a government cares for are exactly those individuals
whom it taxes. Moreover, individuals are suﬃciently footloose that there is no meaningful
distinction between residents and citizens that might justify diﬀerential tax treatment of
them.8
6Unlike Epple and Romer (1991) and Morelli, Yang, and Ye (2010), there is no voting in our model.
7If nobody of type i resides in country j, then the value of u
j
i can be chosen arbitrarily. Because all
individuals of the same type obtain the same utility when the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed, it
is only necessary to consider the number of individuals who reside in a country and their common level
of utility.
8The beneﬁts provided by citizenship introduce frictions to mobility that have been ruled out by our
assumption that labor is freely mobile. In a model with mobility costs, it would be natural to consider
the possibility of subjecting residents and citizens to diﬀerent tax schedules. Actual practice in this
regard varies from country to country. For example, a citizen of the United States is subject to U.S. tax
on his worldwide income regardless of his country of residence, whereas a Canadian citizen is not liable
for tax in Canada if he resides elsewhere. For discussions of the relative merits of diﬀerent proposals
about who should count in a country’s social welfare function, who it should tax, and how it should
compute its income tax base, see Mirrlees (1982), Cremer and Pestieau (2004), and Wilson (2006).
7The average utilitarian form of each government’s objective gives rise to an important
trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, if individuals were not mobile, an average utilitarian govern-
ment would want to depart from the laissez-faire outcome by redistributing income from
more highly-skilled to less highly-skilled individuals, provided that the natural conditions
on individual utility functions described by Dixit and Seade (1979) are satisﬁed. On the
other hand, because the self-selection constraints imply that utilities are increasing in
type, governments have an incentive to attract the most highly-skilled individuals and to
encourage the lowest-skilled individuals to locate in the other country so as to increase
the average utility of their residents. Thus, each government faces a tension between the
desire to redistribute resources from higher skill types to lower skill types and the possi-
bility that, if taken too far, this redistribution might lead to exit by higher skill types and
entry of lower skill types with a concomitant decrease in average utility. As emphasized
by Cremer and Pestieau (2004) and Wilson (2006), this tension plays a fundamental role
in the literature on redistributive taxation in the presence of mobile labor.
In addition to taking account of the self-selection constraints, each government must
ensure that it has suﬃcient resources to carry out the redistribution that is required to
implement the labor-consumption choices of those individuals who choose to reside in
its county. Formally, the allocation of consumption and pretax income (eﬀective labor)














i,j = A,B. (2.5)








i ≥ 0. (2.6)
The two governments choose their tax schedules simultaneously with a view to max-
imizing the welfare in their respective states. A pair of tax schedules τA(·) and τB(·)i s
a (Nash) equilibrium if:
1. they induce a distribution of allocations that satisﬁes (2.2);
2. the allocations chosen from the tax schedules satisfy the materials balance con-
straints (2.5).
3. neither government has an incentive to change its tax function given the tax func-
tion used in the other country. Formally, for i = A,B: given τj(·), no ˜ τi(·)  = τi(·)
induces a set of allocations and residential decisions that both increases the value
of the objective (2.4) for country i and satisﬁes the materials balance constraint
(2.5) for country i.
When deciding on the potential beneﬁts of revising the allocation it oﬀers, a govern-
ment anticipates the income-consumption and locational responses of individuals to these
8changes. It is possible that the allocation announced by one country, perhaps one that is
obtained by deviating from a candidate equilibrium, results in a set of individual residen-
tial decisions that leave the other government with a budget deﬁcit. Indeed, whenever a
government, say in country A, considers modifying the allocation it oﬀers for the express
purpose of attracting individuals who pay positive taxes in the other country without
otherwise altering the distribution of the other types of individuals across countries, the
policy change in question results in a loss of revenue in the other country. Imposing
the restriction that country B’s revenue constraint be satisﬁed after A changes its oﬀer
is inconsistent with the notion of Nash equilibrium, for such a restriction requires, con-
trary to the usual Nash conjectures, that country A foresees a budget-balancing response
by country B.9 Note, however, that the revenue constraints of both governments are
satisﬁed in equilibrium.
3. The Impossibility of Taxing the High Skilled
A government engaging in redistributive taxation has an incentive to attract highly-
skilled taxpayers from the other country. In single-country formulations of the optimal
nonlinear income tax problem, the tax paid is nondecreasing in the skill level if, as is
typically the case, the government wants to redistribute resources towards the lower
skilled individuals.10 The more skilled individuals pay taxes that help ﬁnance transfers
to individuals with low skills. This observation suggests that a country might wish to
attract highly-skilled individuals in order to make it easier to ﬁnance its redistributive
goals. Moreover, because utility is increasing in the skill level, a government with an
average utilitarian objective function would want to attract these individuals for the
direct contribution they make to social welfare. The ability to announce a fully nonlinear
tax schedule provides governments with a powerful tool to compete for the most highly-
skilled individuals. As we now show in Proposition 1, this tool is ﬂexible enough to allow
a country to attract some individuals that live in the other country and whose presence
would increase its average utility provided that the immigrants pay positive taxes.
Proposition 1. There does not exist an equilibrium in which there is a type i and a
country j for which T
j
i > 0, N
j
i > 0, and ui is larger than the average utility in country
k  = j.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that such an equilibrium exists. Without loss
of generality, suppose that T B
i > 0, NB
i > 0, and ui is larger than the average utility in






i) be the bundle oﬀered by country j to a type i
individual. Starting with the allocations on oﬀer in the candidate equilibrium, we show
how at least one country can modify its proposed allocation so as to increase its average
9Piaser (2007), Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2010), and Morelli, Yang, and Ye (2010) also employ this
equilibrium concept in their studies of income tax competition.
10This result is a direct consequence of combining Proposition 6 in Guesnerie and Seade (1982) with
Proposition 1 in Brito, Hamilton, Slutsky, and Stiglitz (1990).
9utility while at the same time satisfying all of the constraints that it faces. We note that
when considering self-selection constraints, the single-crossing property implies that it is
suﬃcient to consider the self-selection constraints between adjacent types.11
We ﬁrst suppose that NA
i > 0. It then follows from the self-selection constraints (2.2)
that xA
i and xB
i are on the same indiﬀerence curve.
We begin by showing that xA
i = xB
i . On the contrary, suppose that xA
i  = xB
i .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that xA
i   xB
i . Let country A modify its oﬀer
by replacing xA
i with an ˜ xA
i lying above the type i indiﬀerence curve through xA
i and xB
i ,
below the type i−1 indiﬀerence curve through xB
i , and below the type i+1 indiﬀerence
curve through xA
i , as illustrated in Figure 1.12 By self-selection and single-crossing, all
individuals of a type other than i strictly prefer the bundle designed for them in the
country they are currently residing to ˜ xA
i . Thus, the only eﬀect of the change is to induce
all type i individuals to now choose ˜ xA
i . In particular, type i individuals initially residing
in country B move to country A. Choose k ∈{ A,B} such that T k




i = T B
i , k can be chosen arbitrarily.) Because T B
i > 0, it follows that T k
i > 0 as well.
By choosing ˜ xA
i suﬃciently close to xk






i ). For either choice of k, the ﬁrst term in this expression is
positive. The second term is arbitrarily close to 0 if k = A and it is nonnegative if k = B.
Hence, the change in country A’s tax revenue is positive, and so replacing xA
i with ˜ xA
i is
feasible for country A. (The case in which k = B is illustrated in Figure 1.) Because,
by hypothesis, the utility of type i individuals initially living in country B is larger than
the average utility in country A and because all type i individuals now live in country A
and have a larger utility than they did before country A’s oﬀer is modiﬁed, the average
utility in country A increases. Therefore, the initial allocation oﬀered by country A is
not a best response to the one oﬀered by country B. We have thus shown that xA
i = xB
i ,
which implies that T A
i = T B
i .
There are three cases to consider. In the ﬁrst case, either i = n or there exists a k>i
such that all individuals of type k strictly prefer their bundle(s) to xB
i with all types
between i and k bunched with type i.13 In this case, country A can oﬀer an allocation ˜ xA
i
like the one shown in Figure 1, where now if i  = n the indiﬀerence curve for type i+1is
replaced with the indiﬀerence curve of type k individuals through their initial bundle(s)
(and xA
i coincides with xB
i ). This oﬀer induces all individuals of type i,...,k− 1t o
choose ˜ xA
i regardless of their initial country of residence. If ˜ xA
i is chosen to be suﬃciently
close to xB
i , reasoning as above, the new oﬀer is feasible for country A because it attacts
all individuals of these types from country B and the tax revenue raised from them
more than compensates for any loss in revenue from the initial residents of these types
in country A. Moreover, by incentive-compatibility, any individual who is more skilled
than type i has an initial utility that exceeds ui. Because ui is larger than the initial
11See Matthews and Moore (1987) for a justiﬁcation of this claim and related discussion.
12If i = 1 (resp. i = n), then we only need to consider the self-selection constraints between types i+1
and i (resp. types i − 1 and i). Henceforth, we do not consider special cases like these explicitly.
13It is possible that k = i + 1, in which case nobody is bunched with type i.
10average utility in country A, the immigration raises this country’s average utility. The
increase in the utilities of the initial residents of country A of types i,...,k− 1 raises it
even more. Hence, the change in country A’s oﬀer results in it having a larger average
utility.
In the second case, everybody more highly skilled than type i is bunched with type
i. Formally, for all j ∈{ A,B} and all k>ifor which N
j
k > 0, x
j
k = xB
i . Without loss of
generality, suppose that NB
n > 0. By oﬀering an allocation ˜ xA
n suﬃciently close to xB
i that
lies below the type n−1 indiﬀerence curve through xB
i but above the type n indiﬀerence
curve through xB
i , as illustrated in Figure 2, only the type n individuals change their
choice; they now all choose ˜ xA
n and pay a positive tax. Such a change increases the utility
of any type n individuals already resident in country A and attracts all of this type of
individual living in country B. Because the type n individuals have the highest utility
of all types, country A’s average utility increases. As above, if there is any loss in tax
revenue from the initial type n residents of country A, it is more than compensated for
by the tax revenue received from the new residents.
In the third case, there exists a j ∈{ A,B} and a k>ifor which N
j
k > 0 such that
x
j
k  = xB
i , both x
j
k and xB
i are on the same type k indiﬀerence curve, and all types between
i and k (if any) are bunched with type i. There are two subcases.
In the ﬁrst subcase, NA
k T A
k ≤ 0. Then, country A can oﬀer a bundle ˜ xA
k lying above
the type k indiﬀerence curve though xB
i , below the type k −1 indiﬀerence curve through
xB
i , and below the type k + 1 indiﬀerence curve through x
j
k, but suﬃciently close to xB
i
so that positive taxes are raised at ˜ xA
k , as illustrated in Figure 3. Now, all individuals of
type k choose to reside in country A and pay positive taxes there, whereas tax revenue in
country A from this type was non-positive before the new oﬀer. Moreover, by incentive-
compatibility, the utility of type k individuals is larger than that of type i individuals.
Because only the type k individuals change the bundle chosen, reasoning as above, this
change is feasible for country A and increases its average utility.
In the second subcase, NA
k T A
k > 0. The bundle ˜ xA
k used in the previous subcase
might result in a loss in revenue for country A, which may not be feasible. Suppose that
country A instead makes simultaneous oﬀers ˜ xA
i and ˜ xA
k chosen so that (i) ˜ xA
i lies below
the type i − 1 and above the type i indiﬀerence curve through xB
i , but below the type
k + 1 indiﬀerence curve through xA
k and (ii) ˜ xA
k lies above the type k indiﬀerence curve
though xB
i , below the type k−1 indiﬀerence curve through xB
i , and below the type k+1
indiﬀerence curve through xA
k . Everybody of type i,...,k− 1 chooses ˜ xA
i , everybody
of type k chooses ˜ xA
k , and the rest of the population keeps their original bundles. This
pair of oﬀers is illustrated in Figure 4. For ˜ xA
i suﬃciently close to xB
i and ˜ xA
k suﬃciently
close to xA
k , any potential small losses in tax revenue from individuals of types i,...,k
initially residing in country A are outweighed by the inﬂow of taxpayers of these types
from country B. There must be such an inﬂow because NB
i > 0. As above, the inﬂow
of these individuals and the increase in the utilities of these types initially resident in
country A also increases in the average utility in country A.
If NA
i = 0, it need not be the case that xA
i = xB
i . Nevertheless, in each of the three
11cases considered above, the same argument applies when all statements about bunching
with type i are interpeted as being about bunching with type i residents of country B.
The bundle xA
i may or may not lie on the type i indiﬀerence curve though xB
i and it may
well be the case that some higher types may be indiﬀerent between their bundles and
xA
i even though nobody chooses xA
i . Of course, if NA
i = 0, country A does not have to
worry about losing tax revenue from type i residents when it makes them a new oﬀer.
Having shown that the allocation oﬀered by one of the countries in the candidate
equilibrium is not a best reply to the one oﬀered by the other country, we conclude that
no such equilibrium exists.
To gain some intuition for Proposition 1, suppose that individuals of skill type i live in
country B, pay positive taxes, and have a utility that is larger than the average utility in
country A (i.e., they are relatively high skilled). The simplest case to consider is the one
in which (a) no downward self-selection constraint binds with what is oﬀered to type i
individuals by either country and (b) there are individuals with this skill initially resident
in both countries. Given the assumptions of Proposition 1, when (b) holds, individuals
with this skill must be oﬀered the same income-consumption bundle and pay the same
taxes in both countries in equilibrium. If (a) also holds, because preferences satisfy the
single-crossing property, it is possible to attract this skill type from country B by making
them a slightly better oﬀer without aﬀecting where an individual of any other skill type
locates or what bundle he chooses. Because these immigrants raise average utility and
because the utilities of the initial residents of country A of type i are increased with the
new oﬀer, it is worthwhile to induce this skill type to immigrate from country B. It is also
also possible to do so without violating country A’s budget constraint because the new
oﬀer can be made arbitrarily close to the initial oﬀer for this type, which, by assumption,
raises positive taxes. Even though country A might collect less tax revenue per person
from some of its existing residents of this type, the additional tax revenue it receives from
the immigrants more than compensates for any loss of pre-existing revenues. The small
losses at the intensive margin are of marginal signiﬁcance compared to the revenue gains
at the extensive margin. If either there are no initial residents of type i in country A or
individuals of this type face a binding downward self-selection contraint, the arguments
are somewhat more complex and it may be that it is an even more highly-skilled type of
individual that is enticed to move, but the basic intuition remains the same: nonlinear
income taxes are ﬂexible enough to feasibly attract some highly-skilled individuals who
pay positive taxes even though there may be a small loss in tax revenue from some existing
residents. Hence, either country can feasibly raid the other country for its highly-skilled
workers. Because these are the individuals with above average utilities, governments that
want to maximize the average utility of their residents have an incentive to engage in
such self-defeating competition.
The most highly skilled have the highest utility in the population. As a consequence,
Proposition 1 has immediate implications for the taxation of these individuals.
12Corollary 1. There does not exist an equilibrium in which either (a) T A
n > 0 and NA
n > 0
or (b) T B
n > 0 and NB
n > 0.
Corollary 1 demonstrates that the intense competition for the most highly skilled
makes it impossible for either government to raise any tax revenue from these individuals.
Each government can design its tax schedule in such a way as to oﬀer income-consumption
bundles targeted directly at individuals of type n. Because these individuals are com-
pletely mobile, either government can attract all individuals of type n by oﬀering them a
utility level slightly above that oﬀered by its competitor. Therefore, if the highest-skilled
individuals pay positive taxes, the governments engage in Bertrand-type competition by
undercutting the taxes levied on these individuals in the other country.
4. The Impossibility of Subsidizing the Low Skilled
In the absence of labor mobility between countries, a country with redistributive goals
transfers resources to its lowest-skilled residents, who pay a negative tax. However,
when the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed, these individuals are the residents with
the lowest utilities post transfer. As a consequence, if labor is mobile, there are strong
incentives to induce the lowest-skilled residents to emigrate. If a country succeeds in
inducing its poorest residents to move without otherwise aﬀecting who resides within its
borders and without changing what it oﬀers to the other types of individuals, then it will
have increased the average utility of its remaining inhabitants. Furthermore, it will run a
budget surplus, and it may be possible to use this surplus to further increase the utilities
of these residents. However, simply reducing the subsidy oﬀered to the lowest-skilled
residents by reducing the consumption oﬀered to them may not lead to any mobility
because what is oﬀered to these individuals in the other country may be so unattractive
that none of these individuals want to relocate there. Nevertheless, in Proposition 2
below, we show that the competition between the two countries is suﬃciently intense
that no country will subsidize its least-skilled residents in equilibrium. Thus, the tax
competition thwarts the redistributive goals of both governments.
To formally state Proposition 2, we need to introduce some further notation. Consider
an equilibrium pair of allocations (aA,a B). Let ij, j = A,B, denote the smallest type








An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that there is no equilibrium in which
the lowest skilled receive a subsidy in any country in which they reside.
Corollary 2. There does not exist an equilibrium in which either (a) T A
1 < 0 and NA
1 > 0
or (b) T B
1 < 0 and NB
1 > 0.
13The proof of Proposition 2 is rather lengthy. It may be found in the Appendix. Here,
we provide an overview of the proof strategy and oﬀer some intuition for the result.
The proof is by contradiction. For concreteness, suppose that country A subsidizes
its lowest-skilled residents, who are of type k1, and that its next lowest-skilled residents
are of type k2. The proof proceeds by showing that it is then possible for one of the
countries to oﬀer a new allocation that increases its average utility without violating
either its budget constraint or the self-selection constraints once the individuals have
reoptimized. We ﬁrst consider the case in which the upward self-selection constraint in
country A between type k1 and type k2 does not bind.
If anybody of type k1 also lives in country B, the self-selection constraints imply that
individuals of this skill type are indiﬀerent about where they live. Hence, if country A
simply reduces the consumption oﬀered to this type, its lowest-skilled residents emigrate.
Because they are also the residents with the smallest utility, their out migration increases
country A’s average utility. Furthermore, because country A now runs a budget surplus,
the new allocation oﬀered by it is feasible.
If nobody of type k1 lives in country B, then if country A reduces the consumption
oﬀered to type k1 individuals, they may not move; they might instead either accept the
new oﬀer or choose one of the other income-consumption bundles oﬀered by this country.
When NB
k1 = 0, there are two cases. (i) If the average utility of all but type k1 is no
smaller in country A than in country B, we show that it is then possible for country B to
increase its average utility by inducing these types to immigrate without also attacting
country A’s type k1 residents. (ii) If the average utility of all but type k1 is smaller in
country A than in country B, we show that it is then possible for country A to increase its
average utility either by inducing its lowest-skilled residents to emigrate or by inducing
all of the residents of country B to immigrate.
In case (i), the residents of country A with skill type at least k2 pay positive taxes in
the aggregate and they have an average utility no smaller than the residents of country
B, which makes them a desirable target for the latter country. Country B can induce
just these types of individuals to immigrate by changing what it oﬀers to them. These
oﬀers are determined by ﬁrst showing that there are income-consumption bundles ¯ xB
i
for i ≥ k2 with ¯ xB
i on the initial indiﬀerence curve for this type that (a) would not
violate any self-selection constraint and (b) would give country B a budget surplus if it
attracts all of these types of individuals from country A. If everybody whose type is at
least k2 accepts the new income-consumption bundle oﬀered to them, not only is country
B’a allocation feasible, it also does not reduce its average utility. However, because the
residents of country A with these skill types are not made strictly better oﬀ with what
is now oﬀered to them by country B, they may not choose to move. Nevertheless, their
positive tax revenue can be used to induce them to move. By oﬀering each of these types
an appropriately chosen income-consumption bundle ˆ xB
i arbitrarily close to ¯ xB
i , each of
these types can be made better oﬀ, thereby increasing country B’s average utility, without
violating its budget constraint. Again, the tax revenue gained from the in migration
more than compensates for any marginal loss of tax revenue from the existing residents
14of country B. The ˆ xB
i bundles need to be chosen so that no self-selection constraint is
violated. Because preferences satisfy the single-crossing property and the self-selection
constraints are satisﬁed with the ¯ xB
i bundles, this can be done by ﬁrst increasing both
the consumption and income of type n individuals in such a way that they are made
better oﬀ and such that their new bundle, ˆ xB
n, lies below the type n − 1 indiﬀerence
curve through ¯ xB
n−1. Type n − 1 is now not subject to any binding downward incentive
constraint, so similar adjustments can be made to its bundle. Iterating this argument
one type at a time, all individuals with skill types at least k2 can be made better oﬀ.
Hence, it is feasible for country B to increase its average utility by inducing everybody
except the lowest-skilled residents of country A to move.
In case (ii), country A ﬁrst reduces the consumption oﬀered to type k1 by an amount
that keeps the upward self-selection constraint with type k2 slack and then oﬀers the
resulting income-consumption bundle to everybody with a type less than k2.14 If this
induces the lowest-skilled residents to emigrate, then, as above, country A has successfully
raised its average utility. If the new bundle does not induce out migration, country A is
nevertheless left with a budget surplus that it can use to attract all of the residents of
country B, thereby raising its average utility. By making the reduction in consumption
oﬀered to the low skilled described above suﬃciently small, country A can ensure that
type k1 individuals do not face any binding downward self-selection constraints. The
oﬀers country A uses to induce the residents of country B to relocate are constructed
in the same way as in case (i). For those less skilled than k1, this can be done without
violating any self-selection constraint because the type k1 individuals do not face any
binding downward self-selection constraint.15 Hence, in this case, country A can feasibly
increase its average utility.
It remains to deal with the case in which the upward self-selection constraint in
country A between its lowest-skilled residents (type k1) and its second lowest-skilled
residents (type k2) binds. If the type k2 individuals in country A do not receive at least
as large as subsidy as the type k1 individuals, then the latter individuals can be made a
new oﬀer arbitrarily close to what is oﬀered to type k2 that makes them better oﬀ and
that only they will choose. This leaves country A with a budget surplus and raises its
average utility. Hence, if the initial allocations are an equilibrium, then 0 >T A
k1 ≥ T A
k2.
Letting k3 denote the next lowest-skilled type of resident in country A, the same basic
proof strategy as described above with some modiﬁcations can be used to show (a) that
if the upward self-selection constraint in country A between type k2 and type k3 does
not bind, then there is a contradiction with the assumption that the initial situation is
an equilibrium and (b) that otherwise, 0 >T A
k1 ≥ T A
k2 ≥ T A
k3. Iterating this argument,
we either obtain a contradiction as above in the case of a non-binding upward incentive
14Recall that of these types, only those of type k1 live in country A.
15For those lower skilled than type k1, the natural analogue of the procedure used to generate new
oﬀers for the high skilled would instead use reductions in consumption and income to induce the low
skilled in country B (who may be paying taxes that are needed to satisfy country A’s budget constraint)
to relocate. However, this is not possible if the lowest skilled face a binding nonnegativity constraint.
15constraint or we ﬁnd that all of the residents of country A are being subsidized, which is
not feasible. Thus, we conclude that the lowest-skilled residents of either country cannot
be subsidized in equilibrium.
While a country that subsidizes its lowest-skilled residents would like them to emigrate
so as to increase the average utilty of the remaining residents, it is not always possible
to induce only them to move. Nevertheless, as our summary of the proof strategy of
Proposition 2 makes clear, there is always some way for one of the countries to take
advantage of any subsidy paid to these individuals. Hence, they cannot be subsidized
in equilibrium. As in Proposition 1, the intense competition between the two countries
reduces their ability to pursue their redistributive objectives.
5. Examples of Equilibria
While equilibria with positive taxes for the most highly-skilled individuals and subsidies
for the lowest skilled do not exist, there are situations in which equilibria exist in the
tax competition problem being considered here. In this section, we provide examples
of two kinds of equilibria for the two-type case. In the ﬁrst example, each country
oﬀers the laissez-faire allocation. With the laissez-faire allocation, an individual of type
i receives the unique income-consumption bundle that maximizes his utility subject to
the constraint that his consumption equals his pretax income. In the second example,
the low skilled subsidize the high skilled.
Example 1. If n = 2, it is an equilibrium for each country to oﬀer the laissez-faire
allocation for its residents when one country has all of the type 1 individuals and all the
type 2 individuals live in the other country. To show why this is an equilibrium, without
loss of generality, suppose that all the type 1 (resp. type 2) individuals live in country A
(resp. country B).
Country A has no incentive to tax the type 1 individuals so as to induce them to move
because this would leave it without any inhabitants, resulting in social welfare of −∞.
It cannot induce the type 2 individuals to leave country B without oﬀering a subsidy. If
it tried to ﬁnance this subsidy by taxing individuals of type 1, they would leave and take
up the laissez-faire oﬀer of country B. Thus, no such subsidy is feasible. Country B has
no incentive to attract the type 1 individuals because to do so would decrease average
utility in country B. Thus, neither country can ﬁnd a better reply to the laissez-faire tax
schedule when the population is segregated.
When both economies are initially tax free, the only way for a country to increase the
utility of a group of individuals—either by beneﬁting some of its existing residents or by
attracting individuals from the other country—is to oﬀer them a transfer. However, this
transfer must be ﬁnanced from taxes levied on another group. Because the other country
has no taxes, these would-be taxpayers emigrate.
Laissez-faire equilibria are supported by only very special distributions of the pop-
ulation in the two-type case. There are no laissez-faire equilibria when there are more
than two types. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, no self-selection constraints bind between
16diﬀerent types of individuals. If there are three or more types, at least one country must
have residents of more than one type. If it oﬀers less consumption to all of these types
except for the highest-skilled of them, the individuals with the new oﬀers all emigrate,
thereby increasing the average utility of the remaining residents.
The economic forces sustaining the laissez-faire equilibrium can also sustain equilibria
in which some low-skilled individuals pay positive taxes in both countries in order to make
transfers to the most highly-skilled individuals in the population. This point can be most
simply illustrated when there are two types.
Example 2. Suppose that n =2 ,N1 = N2 =2 ,w1 =1 ,w2 = 2, and




Each country oﬀers a common tax schedule that induces individuals to choose the income-
consumption pairs illustrated in Figure 5, with one person of each skill type residing in
each country. In this allocation, the marginal rate of substitution between income and
consumption equals 1 for each type of individual; that is, everyone faces a zero implicit
marginal tax rate on income. We suppose that T1 = 1 and, hence, that T2 = −1. Thus,
the individuals with skill w1 (type 1) are taxed so as to make transfers to the individuals
with skill w2 (type 2).






subject to ci = yi − Ti. (5.2)
The optimized value of problem (5.2) is
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Setting w1 = 1, we obtain
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We show that country A (and, hence, also country B) cannot increase its average
utility. Because everybody has a marginal rate of substitution equal to 1, the only way
to increase the utility of one type of individual is to lower the tax paid by any individual
of that type. If country A could costlessly induce the individual of type 2 residing in
country B to move without modifying what anybody else chooses, it would do so because
this move would increase its average utility by changing the composition of its residents.
17However, this type 2 individual will move only if given an incentive to do so in the form of
an increased transfer. Country A would have to raise additional tax revenue from type 1
individuals in order to cover the combined cost of a larger transfer for its existing type 2
resident and the additional transfer it must now pay to its new type 2 resident. However,
any attempt to increase the tax paid by the type 1 individual residing in country A
induces him to move to country B. Thus, country A cannot feasibly attract the other
type 2 individual in this way.
Moreover, country A has no incentive to attract the type 1 individual living in country
B because this would decrease its average utility. To see why, ﬁrst note that the most
beneﬁcial way for country A to attract the type 1 resident of country B and still raise
enough tax revenue to pay for the transfer to its type 2 resident is to oﬀer the income-
consumption bundle that a type 1 individual would choose if it faced a lump-sum tax
of   T1 = T1/2. This new oﬀer induces the type 1 individual residing in country B to
relocate. The two type 1 individuals generate suﬃcient tax revenue to keep the transfer
that country A provides to its type 2 resident constant. The utility levels associated with
this modiﬁed tax system are
ˆ u1 = −
T1
2






The average utility generated in country A is now
  W =














The new proposal reduces the average utility in country A if W ∗ −   W is negative, which
is equivalent to the term in square brackets on the right-hand sides of both (5.5) and







For our assumed values of w2 = 2 and T1 = 1, the left-hand side of (5.8) is approximately
0.69, whereas the right-hand side is 0.5, so this inequality is satisﬁed.
Country A could also contemplate making oﬀers that are only attractive to the type
1 individuals. The best such oﬀer is the laissez-faire allocation. In this case, country A’s
average utility is
  W = 2[ln(w1) − 1], (5.9)
which is equal to −2 for our assumed value of w1 = 1. Because u∗
1 = −2 and u∗
2 >u ∗
1,
W ∗ >   W, so it is not in country A’s interest to change its oﬀer in this way.
Hence, for the parameter values used in this example, neither country can feasibly
modify the allocation illustrated in Figure 5 in a welfare-improving way.16
16It is clear from the preceding discussion that this conclusion is quite robust with respect to the
choice of parameter values.
18Our analysis of tax competition has a number of features in common with the com-
petition in insurance markets studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However, there
are also important diﬀerences. In the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, there are two types of
individuals (high risk and low risk) and the ﬁrms that provide insurance only care about
expected proﬁts, with the free entry of ﬁrms driving proﬁts for each risk class to zero. In
contrast, the countries in our model want to maximize the average utility of its residents
and there are are ﬁxed number of countries. There is a dual motive for attracting the
most highly skilled when they pay postive taxes—they bring tax revenue and they also
contribute directly to the objective function of the government. Similarly, there is a dual
motive for encouraging the lowest skilled to emigrate if they are subidized—doing so
reduces the transfers being paid and increases the average utility of those who remain
if this strategy is succssful. Thus, tax competition generates pressure for a race to the
bottom, with the competition possibly being so ﬁerce that it can be optimal to subsidize
the highly skilled.
In the two-type insurance model considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz, whether an
equilibrium exists depends on (i) the degree of risk aversion (preferences), (ii) the relative
proportions of the two types (the type distribution), and (iii) the gap between the high-
risk and low-risk probabilities of an accident (the support of the distribution). With
more than two types, the existence of an equilibrium also depends on these three factors:
preferences, the type distribution, and the support of the distribution. The same is true
in our model.17 However, we expect the existence problem to be less severe in our tax
competition problem than in the insurance problem because the countries do not face
the threat of entry by new jurisdictions or exit by existing jurisdictions.
6. Concluding Remarks
The threat posed to redistributive taxation by subnational governments led Stigler (1957)
to advocate centralizing the redistributive role of government. The same reasoning could
be applied to argue that national governments should transfer the responsibility for re-
distributive taxation to a supranational government, such as the European Union.
The economy considered in this article has two features that make it very diﬃcult
to sustain redistribution from the rich to the poor. First, the average utilitarian social
welfare function used to evaluate tax policies, when combined with the requirements
of self-selection, creates an incentive for countries to attract highly-skilled taxpayers.18
Many studies of income taxation in the presence of migration cite the revenue loss associ-
ated with emigration as a reason to provide incentives for the highly skilled not to move.
17Existence becomes more problematic as the gap between adjacent types (the values of wi+1 − wi
in our model) goes to 0. With a continuum of types, this gap is 0. See Riley (2001, Section 3.1) for a
discussion of this issue when there is a zero-proﬁt constraint and a continuum of types.
18In the words of Johnson (1965, p. 300), our model generates the fundamental motive for worrying
about a brain drain: the highly skilled “make a contribution to national welfare that goes beyond the
money value of the services they perform and that this contribution can only be enjoyed if these people
are resident within the nation.”
19See, for example, the survey by Cremer and Pestieau (2004). But, as we have empha-
sized, this is not the only reason why the high skilled are desirable residents; they are also
desirable for the direct contribution they make to social welfare. Assuming that the gov-
ernments pursue an average utilitarian objective is just one way to capture this concern.
Any social welfare function for which the more highly skilled make a greater contribution
than do the more lowly skilled, ceteris paribus, generates such a concern. More generally,
a desire to have a population that is, on average, more skilled might originate from the
general equilibrium eﬀects of population composition on wages or the popular view that
skilled workers are particularly valuable to a country in a knowledge-based economy.
Second, the perfect mobility of labor results in the competition for skilled individuals
being particularly intense. Costless mobility is an extreme assumption. When mobility is
costless, marginal changes in government policy can induce discrete changes in population
composition. Moreover, when a marginal tax change leads to non-marginal migration
across borders, the eﬀects of this migration on either welfare or budget balance outweigh
whatever within-country eﬀects the change might have. Thus, in our model, migration
ultimately trumps other considerations. However, contrary to the view expressed by
Piaser (2007, p. 75), free mobility does not necessarily lead to laissez-faire. Given a strong
enough desire to attract the most highly skilled, governments might actually settle on an
equilibrium in which the most highly skilled receive a net transfer.
In order to make clear-cut statements about optimal marginal tax rates, our model
needs to be modiﬁed so that marginal changes in taxes induce marginal changes in
population composition. Models with individual-speciﬁc mobility costs, like the ones
presented by Piaser (2007), Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2010), and Morelli, Yang, and
Ye (2010), or some form of residential attachment, as in Blackorby, Brett, and Cebreiro
(2007), provide settings in which to examine how the interaction of labor mobility and
strategic tax competition aﬀects marginal, not just average, tax rates. Alternatively,
allowing a greater degree of diversity between countries by, for example, allowing for
governments to provide diﬀerentiated public services as in Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
might serve to soften competition. The extent to which the race-to-the-bottom thesis
remains valid for personal income taxation in these settings is not yet fully explored.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose
that T A
iA < 0. Let k1 = iA. Note that T A
k1 < 0 implies that cA
k1 > 0. Furthermore, in
order for country A’s revenue constraint to be satisﬁed, it must be raising a positive tax
revenue from types iA
k1 + 1 through n.






i) be the bundle oﬀered to a type i individual by country
j in the candidate equilibrium. If type i individuals live in both countries, by the self-
selection constraints, they must receive the same utility. Thus, we can let ui denote the
utility a type i individual obtains when he chooses from this menu of options, regardless
20of whether individuals of this type reside in both countries.
We ﬁrst show that there must be at least one individual living in country B. Suppose
that this is not the case and, thus, that the level of social welfare in country B is −∞.
In order for country A to satisfy its revenue constraint, there must be some type k for
which NA
k > 0 and T A
k > 0. Let ˆ xk =( ˆ ck, ˆ yk) be the bundle that maximizes type k utility
subject to the constraint that ck = yk. If country B oﬀers the allocation in which ˆ xB
k =ˆ xk
and ˆ xB
j =( 0 ,0) for all j  = k, then all individuals of type k relocate to country B,a sd o e s
any other individual whose initial bundle is dominated by one of the two bundles oﬀered
by country B. In this allocation, the residents of country B simply consume what they
produce, so country B’s revenue constraint holds with equality. Furthermore, all of the
self-selection constraints are satisﬁed. The average utility in country B is no longer −∞
and, hence, it is not an equilibrium to have nobody live in country B.
Let k2 be the smallest type larger than k1 for which NA
k2 > 0. We consider two cases.
Case 1. The upward self-selection constraint in country A between type k1 and type
k2 does not bind; that is, v(xA
k1;wk1) >v (xA
k2;wk1). There are three subcases.
Subcase 1. In this subcase, NB
k1 > 0. By the self-selection constraints (2.2), xA
k1 and
xB
k1 are on the same indiﬀerence curve. Choose ε>0 so that cA
k1 − ε ≥ 0. Suppose
that country A changes its oﬀer to ˜ aA by letting ˜ cA
i = cA
k1 − ε for all i =1 ,...,k2 − 1,
with all of the other components of aA unchanged. The individuals of type k1 all strictly
prefer xB
k1 to any bundle oﬀered by country A and so locate in country B. No other type
of individual is aﬀected by the change in the allocation oﬀered by country A. Because
T A
k1 < 0 and NA
k1 > 0, the exit of individuals of type k1 from country A leave it with a
budget surplus. By the self-selection constraints and the deﬁnition of k1, these individuals
have the lowest utility in country A. Therefore, when they move, country A’s average
utility increases. Hence, the initial allocations oﬀered by the two countries are not an
equilibrium.
Subcase 2. Now suppose that NB
k1 = 0 and that the average utility of all the types




























We show that it is possible for country B to increase its average utility by attracting all
of the residents of country A except for those of type k1.














,i  = k
1. (A.2)
In (A.2), if NA
i = 0 (resp. NB
i = 0), then ˜ xB
i = xB
i (resp. ˜ xB
i = xA
i ).19 Otherwise, ˜ xB
i is
a weighted sum of the initial bundles chosen by the type i individuals, with the weights
19Note that ˜ xB
i = xB
i for all i<k 2.
21given by the initial population shares of these individuals in the two countries. By the
strict concavity of the utility function v,
v(˜ x
B
i ;wi) ≥ ui,i  = k
1, (A.3)
with a strict equality for any i for which NA
i > 0, NB
i > 0, and xA
i  = xB
i . Now for i  = k1,
choose ¯ ci so that
v(¯ c
B
i , ˜ y
B
i ;wi)=ui,i  = k
1. (A.4)
Note that ¯ ci ≤ ˜ cB
i for all i  = k1. Let ¯ xB
i =( ¯ cB
i , ˜ yB
i ) for i  = k1 and ¯ xB
i = xB
i for i = k1.20
For any initial resident of country A of type i  = k1 (if any), it is a matter of indiﬀer-
ence whether to choose xA
i or ¯ xB
i . Later, we shall provide a positive incentive for these
individuals to move, but for now we simply show that if they all relocate, then country
B runs a budget surplus and all of the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed. More con-
cretely, suppose that all individuals of type i  = k1 choose ¯ xB
i and that the individuals of
type k1 (who all live in country A) keep their initial bundles and do not relocate.
In order to show that country B runs a budget surplus when it oﬀers the allocation
¯ aB =( ¯ xB
1 ,...,¯ xB
n), we ﬁrst determine the revenue implications of having all individuals
of type i  = k1 choose ˜ xB
i . In this case, country B’s tax revenue from all types is the sum
of its initial tax revenue and the tax revenue raised from types i  = k1 in country A in
the candidate equilibrium. The former is nonnegative and the latter is positive. Because
¯ ci ≤ ˜ cB
i for all i  = k1, it follows that country B runs a budget surplus if the individuals
of type i  = k1 instead choose ¯ xB
i .21
By construction, all individuals are indiﬀerent between the bundles they receive in
the candidate equilibrium and in the alternative situation that we are considering in
which country B oﬀers the allocation ¯ aB. Furthermore, the only individuals who receive
a new bundle are individuals of type i  = k1 for whom NA
i > 0, NB
i > 0, and xA
i  = xB
i .
For such an individual, ¯ xB
i lies between xA
i and xB
i on type i’s initial indiﬀerence curve.
Because all of the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed in the candidate equilibrium, by
single-crossing, they are also satisﬁed when country B oﬀers the allocation ¯ aB.22
We now modify the ¯ xB
i bundles so that all individuals of types i ≥ k2 strictly prefer
to locate in country B and so that no self-selection constraint that applies to individuals
of these types binds. For i<k 2, let ˆ xB
i = xB







i)   (0,0) chosen so that v(ˆ xB
i ;wi) >v (¯ xB
i ;wi) and v(ˆ xB
i−1;wi−1) >v (ˆ xB
i ;wi−1)
for all i ≥ k2 and v(ˆ xB
i+1;wi+1) >v (ˆ xB
i ;wi+1) for all i = k2 − 1,...,n− 1. Because
the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed before this modiﬁcation, by single-crossing,
this construction is possible with arbitrarily small values for ε1
i and ε2
i. If country B
oﬀers the ˆ xB
i bundles holding country A’s oﬀered allocation ﬁxed, then all individuals of
type i<k 2 retain their initial bundles and do not move, whereas everyone else locates
20In fact, by construction, ¯ xB
i = xB
i for all i<k 2.
21A more formal argument for this conclusion using Jensen’s inequality can be provided by adapting
the proof of Lemma 4 in Blackorby, Brett, and Cebreiro (2007).
22We do not claim that the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed when country B oﬀers the ˜ xB
i bundles.
22in country B. Furthermore, all of the self-selection constraints are satisﬁed. Because
country B has a budget surplus if all individuals of type i  = k1 reside there and receive
the bundle ¯ xB
i , by choosing the values of ε1
i and ε2
i suﬃciently small, its revenue constraint
will be satisﬁed.
It remains to show that the average utility in country B has increased. By the





















,j = A,B. (A.5)
By (A.1), ¯ uA ≥ ¯ uB. Let ˆ ui be the utility a type i individual obtains when country B
oﬀers the ˆ xB
i bundles and country A oﬀers the xA
i bundles. Because nobody of type k1











i )). We have
 
i =k1 NA












































where the ﬁrst inequality in (A.6) follows from the fact that ˆ ui >u i for all i ≥ k2 and
ˆ ui = ui for all i<k 2, the ﬁrst equality follows from (A.5), and the second inequality
follows from the fact that ¯ uA ≥ ¯ uB. Thus, the average utility in country B increases when
it oﬀers the ˆ xB
i bundles instead of the xB
i bundles, which contradicts the assumption that
the initial oﬀers are in equilibrium.
Subcase 3. Now suppose that NB
k1 = 0 and that the average utility of all the types
residing in country A excluding type k1 is smaller than the average utility in country B.


























Suppose that for all i<k 2, country A replaces xA
i with (cA
k1−ε,yA
k1), where ε>0 has been
chosen suﬃciently small so that cA




except for possibly the individuals of type k1 will choose this new bundle. If this new
oﬀer induces the type k1 individuals to move to country B, then reasoning as in Subcase
1, this change is feasible for country A and it increases its average utility, contradicting
the assumption that the initial oﬀers were an equilibrium. Therefore, after any such oﬀer,
we can suppose that all of the type k1 individuals remain in country A. Consider such




23that the reduction in country A’s average utility in this step can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing ε suﬃciently close to 0. Single-crossing and self-selection imply that
(cA
k1 − ε,yA
k1)   xB
k1−1.
To facilitate the use of the arguments from Subcase 2, we use the same notation for
country A’s modiﬁed oﬀers as for its original oﬀer. Note that the downward incentive
constraints for xA
k1 are slack and that country A has a budget surplus. We show that it
is possible for country A to increase its average utility by attracting all of the residents
of country B.
Let the bundles ¯ xA
i (in obvious notation) be deﬁned as in Subcase 2 but with the
roles of the two countries reversed. For any initial resident of country B of type i  = k1,
it is a matter of indiﬀerence whether to choose xA
i or ¯ xB
i . If they all relocate to country
A, then the latter’s tax revenue from all types is the total tax revenue initially raised by











i)   (0,0)
chosen so that v(ˆ xA
i ;wi) >v (¯ xA
i ;wi) for all i  = k1 and so that no self-selection constraint
binds with any of the bundles oﬀered by country A. This is possible because of the
single-crossing property and the fact that the downward incentive constraints between
xA
k1 and both xA
k1−1 and xB
k1−1 are slack. Everybody now locates in countryA. Reasoning
as in Subcase 2 (with the roles of the two countries reversed), this change is feasible
for country A and it increases its average utility. By choosing   suﬃciently small, this
increase in country A’s average utility more than compensates for the loss in its average
utility in the ﬁrst step of this argument, a contradiction to the assumption that the initial
oﬀers are in equilibrium.
Case 2. The upward self-selection constraint in country A between type k1 and type
k2 binds; that is, v(xA
k1;wk1)=v(xA
k2;wk1).






Hence, the second-lowest-skilled resident in country A is also subsidized.
If xA
k1 = xA
k2, then (A.8) obviously holds because then T A
k1 = T A
k2.I fxA
k1  = xA
k2, in order
to satisfy type k2’s self-selection constraint with xA
k1, we must have xA
k2   xA
k1. Suppose




k2 are on the same indiﬀerence
curve of a type k1 individual, if there exists a k with k1 <k<k 2, then by single-crossing
and self-selection, xB
k = xA
k2 for any such k (recall that NA
k = 0 for such k). Furthermore,
if xB
k2 lies on the type k2 indiﬀerence through xA
k2, then xB
k2 ≥ xA
k2. Suppose that country A
replaces xA
k1 with ˆ xA
k1 = xA









k1−1 = 0). Figure 6 illustrates this construction for the case in which k2 = k1 +2 . I t
follows from the preceding discussion that only individuals of type k1 will choose the
new bundle, all of whom already live in country A. Thus, country A’s average utility
increases. By choosing ε1 and ε2 suﬃciently close to 0, because T A
k1 <T A
k2, country A
now has a budget surplus, so the new allocation is feasible for it. Hence, the supposition
24that T A
k1 <T A
k2 is false and, therefore, (A.8) also holds if xA
k1  = xA
k2.
Step 2. It follows from (A.8) that in order to satisfy country A’s budget constraint, it
must have residents of some type k>k 2 who pay positive taxes. Let k3 be the smallest
type larger than k2 for which NA
k3 > 0.
If the upward self-selection constraint in country A between type k2 and type k3 does
not bind, then to conclude that the initial allocations are not an equilibrium, we can
apply the argument from Case 1 with k2 in place of k1 and k3 in place of k2 with the
following modiﬁcations.
(a) In Subcase 1, all individuals of types k1 and k2 relocate from country A to country
B, thereby raising the average utility in country A and leaving it with a budget surplus.
(b) In Subcase 2, when the ˆ xB
i bundles are deﬁned as above with k3 substituting for
k2, the initial residents of types k1 and k2 in country A remain there, whereas everybody
else lives in country B.23 Because both the type k1 and k2 residents are subsidized in
country A, country B has a budget surplus when it oﬀers the ˆ xB
i bundles. Furthermore,
(A.6) now holds with k2 instead of k1 and the left-hand side of this modiﬁed version of
(A.6) is smaller than the average utility in country B because the type k1 (not just the
type k2) residents of country A do not move and they have the smallest utility in their
country.
(c) In Subcase 3, we begin by having country A replace xA




for i<k 2 and by ˆ xA
k2 =( cA
k2 − ν,yA
k2) for i = k2,...,k3 − 1, where ε>0 and ν>0 have
been chosen suﬃciently small so that cA
k1 − ε ≥ 0, cA





k3;wk2). We have a contradiction unless all individuals of types k1
and k2 remain in country A after any such modiﬁcation to country A’s oﬀered allocation,
in which case individuals of type k1 choose ˆ xA
k1 and individuals of type k2 choose ˆ xA
k2.I n
this case, we choose ε and ν suﬃciently small so that v(ˆ xA
k1;wk1) >v (xB
k1−1;wk1) and so
that the loss in country A’s average utility is arbitrarily small. It must then be the case
that k2 = k1 + 1 and that NB
k1 = 0 (not just, as has been assumed, that NB
k2 = 0), for
otherwise, by single-crossing and self-selection, for i = k1,...,k2 − 1, xB
i would lie on
the type k1 indiﬀerence curve through xA
k1 and, hence, the type k1 individuals would not
remain in country A after it modiﬁes its oﬀer. By letting ˆ xA
i for i = k1,k2 be deﬁned as
above and ˆ xA
i be deﬁned for all other i as in Subcase 3, we proceed as in that subcase.
If the upward self-selection constraint in country A between type k2 and type k3








Step 3. By repeating the preceding argument a ﬁnite number of times (with appro-











where k1 <k 2 <k 3 < ··· <k m and k1,k2,k3,...,km are the types of individuals
resident in country A in the candidate equilibrium. But then every resident of country
23Note that it is now possible for NB
k1 to be positive.
25A is subsidized, which violates its budget constraint. Hence, the initial supposition that
T A
k1 < 0 is false.
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Figure 6: Reforming country A’s tax schedule to increase utility for type k1 individuals
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